Posted By Wayne on September 24, 2021

I’ve had a black and white version of this map for a while but it was printed and carefully cared for in my personal library. I found that the Library of Congress has this Atlas available as individual images! I grabbed those images at the highest resolution I could (TIFF files) and combined them to a PDF. I lost alittle resolution in doing that but not enough to be a problem.

At the risk of drawing the ire of the LoC, I offer up the combined PDF of this amazing work.

Additional DG Beers maps:

1870 Woodford County

1877 Boyle and Mercer Counties

1877 Christian County

1877 Harrison County

1877 Madison County

1877 Marion and Washington Counties

1877 Warren County

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Posted By Wayne on June 26, 2017

[Cover of Harper’s Weekly, March 29th, 1862]

Tennessee was admitted to the Union on June 1^st, 1796.  The history of the region prior to statehood was one of vicious independence, self-reliance and individual liberty.  From the foundations of the Watauga Association in 1770 to the defeat of Ferguson at King’s Mountain during the Revolution, the settlers of East Tennessee seemed to be perfectly willing to take care of their own business whenever the situation presented itself.

Statehood found two major cities growing out of the freshly minted State of Tennessee.  Knoxville had become a central point in East Tennessee and was designated the Capital of the State.  Nashville originally settled in 1779, experienced explosive growth at the astounding rate of 273% due to proximity to river transport and plentiful fertile land.  East Tennessee struggled to reach 20% after an 18% loss of population in 1810.  This massive growth in Middle Tennessee brought with it a swing of political influence.  The Capital was moved from Knoxville to Murfreesboro in 1817 and again to Nashville in 1826.

The fertile lands of Middle and Western Tennessee were tended and the slave population grew as a percentage of the overall population from 13% in 1800 to 21% in 1830.  Slavery was growing concern for the people of East Tennessee.    As early as 1815 Abolitionist societies were forming in the region.  The noted abolitionist Reverend John Rankin joined the local society in his native Jefferson County and an Abolitionist newspaper, the Manumission Intelligencer, was published weekly in Jonesboro.  “That there was a strong anti-slavery feeling in East Tennessee, about 1820, is proven by tradition as well as by such historical facts as we have bearing on the question.  In 1826, there were 143 anti-slavery societies in the United States, of which number 103 were in the South.”[1]  The state of relations between East Tennessee and the rest of the state began to deteriorate during this period.  In 1838, after several pleas by East Tennessee leaders, the General Assembly in Nashville passed a bill for building rail roads in East Tennessee.  Before the project was hardly started the bill was repealed by the Tennessee legislature.  Robert Tracy McKenzie writes in “Lincolnites and Rebels”, “The repeal of the 1838 internal improvements act generated enormous resentment in much of East Tennessee, and more than any other political event prior to the secession crisis, it prompted East Tennesseans to question their attachment to the rest of the state. ”  East Tennessee sought separation from Nashville three times between 1840 and 1843.[2]  By the eve of the Civil War, leaders of East Tennessee were willing to do about anything to free themselves from the calamitous albatross they felt they were attached to in Nashville.

The election of President Lincoln triggered secession votes across the south.  Successful votes to secede by South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas led up to Tennessee and their vote on February 25^th 1861. Secession failed by almost ten thousand votes with East Tennessee leading the opposition with overwhelming margin of 33,000 to 7,000.  Governor Isham Harris promptly called for another vote in June.  The Unionists of East Tennessee met in May at Knoxville in an effort to unify their voice and offer a single platform to the people of Tennessee firmly in opposition to the idea of secession.   Thomas Amos Rogers Nelson was selected as President of the Convention and was the primary author of their final report.[3]   The initial report submitted by Mr. Nelson reflected the anger and frustration felt by unionists.  This report was referred to committee as the only purpose served by publishing these first resolutions would be to further drive a wedge between themselves and Nashville.  Oliver Perry Temple, who was a delegate to the convention from Knox County, said of Nelson’s initial report, “It was fortunate that Mr. Nelson’s resolutions were referred, for if they had been acted on at once, they would have been adopted by an overwhelming majority.  The committee did not get ready to report on the mass of matter submitted to it until the afternoon of the third day.  By that time, much of the heat and excitement at first existing among the delegates had spent its force in speeches and resolutions.  Their minds had somewhat sobered down and reason had resumed its rightful supremacy.”[4]    As the convention drew to a close, Temple and Nelson had toned down the original resolutions and making arrangements for them to be published in Tennessee as well as in Kentucky and Ohio.  Nelson adjourned the convention with the promise that he would call them back at a later date.

As the East Tennesseans waited for the outcome of the secession vote on June 8^th, Chatham Roberdeau Wheat was busy along the wharfs and docks of New Orleans recruiting.  Wheat was a natural charismatic leader.  A West Point graduate, Mexican War veteran, and leader in the Cuban “filibuster” of 1849, he was a man with plenty military experience as well as a love and deep respect for the Southern Cause.  He published an announcement in the New Orleans Daily Crescent on April 18^th 1861 and immediately began recruiting the hard men of the docks.  Thomas Cooper De Leon described these as a “splendid set of animals; medium sized, sunburnt, muscular and wiry as Arabs; and a long, swingy gait told of drill and endurance.”[5]  By June 5^th ,  this “splendid set of animals” were armed and equipped and ready for their orders to Richmond by then Confederate Secretary of War L.P. Walker. [6]  The rail line would take them through a small village about 20 miles northeast of Knoxville called Strawberry Plains.

Shortly after the June 8^th secession of Tennessee, a group of Unionists gathered at Strawberry Plains to discuss the election results and what could be done about it.  The discussion almost certainly was one of anger at the “tyranny of the military power and the still greater tyranny of a corrupt and subsidized press”[7] that led to the successful secession vote.  As they met, a train began to roll by.  Not an uncommon occurrence and likely didn’t draw much attention from the far more important topic of discussion.  That is until rifles poked through the rails of the cars and fired.  These rifles were likely held by some of Wheat’s Louisiana Tigers having just been ordered to Richmond from New Orleans.  William Randolph Carter, a veteran of the 4^th Tennessee Volunteer Infantry(US), wrote:

“During the progress of the meeting a regiment of ‘Louisiana Tigers’ passed by on the cars.  They had been notified of the meeting before leaving the station, and under a full head of steam and with loaded muskets on they came.  When opposite the place where these patriots were quietly discussing the action of Governor Harris they opened fire.  The fire was promptly met with volleys from all kinds of firearms and a rush for the train.  Several men who were near the track attempted to wreck the train by placing cross-ties on the rails.  There were no casualties on the Union side, and as the train kept moving there was no means of knowing whether any of the ‘Tigers’ were hurt or not, but the sides of the cars were perforated with bullets.”[8] 

Later, as the Convention was reconvened on June 17^th 1861, another group of Wheat’s Tigers rolled into Greeneville.  They “cut down the National flag, made threats, committed some minor outrages, and, after a few hours, departed for Virginia.”[9]  These “minor outrages” did not prevent the Convention from completing its work however.  There were two main proposals brought forth.  The first proposed by Convention President Thomas Nelson, was a scathing list of resolutions similar in fervor to the May Resolutions that would have resulted in open civil war between East Tennessee and the rest of the state and, due to the recent vote, the entire Confederacy.  The second proposal submitted by Oliver Temple was much less adversarial and considered far too moderate for Reverend William Blount Carter who strongly supported Nelson’s proposal.  Horace Maynard, Congressional Representative for the 2^nd District which included Knoxville, supported Temple’s proposal.  Both men were strong leaders in the region and the lines were clearly drawn.  The debate was heated and at times very personal.  Nelson and Carter’s supporters seemed to be arguing for taking the fight to Governor Harris while Temple and Maynard’s supporters were arguing for trying to find a way out of this mess with some degree of honor and safety for their families.   After four days of discussions Temple’s proposals were adopted.  The proposals, while not as vitriolic as Nelson’s, still carried the same spirit of independence that led to the settlement of East Tennessee. There were three main points made in the proposals[10]:

• “That we do earnestly desire the restoration of peace to our whole country, and most especially that our own section of the State of Tennessee shall not be involved in civil war.”
• “That the action of the State Legislature in passing the so-called ‘Declaration of Independence,’ and in forming the ‘Military League’ with the Confederate States, and in adopting other acts looking to a separation of Tennessee from the Government of the United States, is unconstitutional and illegal, and therefore not binding upon us as loyal citizens.”
• “and it was further resolved, ‘That in order to avert a conflict with our brethren in other parts of the State, and desiring that every constitutional means shall be resorted to, for the preservation of peace, we do, therefore, constitute and appoint O.P. Temple, of Knox, John Netherland, of Hawkins, and James P. McDowell, of Greene, commissioners, whose duty it shall be to prepare a memorial and cause the same to be presented to the General Assembly of Tennessee, now in session, asking its consent that the counties composing East Tennessee, and such other counties in Middle Tennessee, as desire to co-operate with them, may form and erect a separate State…”

The fathers and grandfathers of these men faced threats from the Crown of England and the Chiefs of the Cherokee but never from their own countrymen on the scale that presented itself in the summer of 1861.  There fellow Tennesseans in middle and western Tennessee were actively preparing for war.  Before, during, and after the Greeneville Convention, Governor Harris was acting to organize a Confederate military presence in the state.[11]  The people of East Tennessee were preparing for the inevitable reaction of the General Assembly in Nashville to the proposals.  Samuel Tate, President of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, wrote to Georgia Senator Robert Toombs on the 28^th of June saying: [12] 

 “I came through East Tennessee yesterday. Saw some of our friends, but many more of our enemies. There is truly great disaffection with those people. It is currently reported and believed that Johnson has made an arrangement at Cincinnati to send 10,000 guns into East Tennessee, and that they have actually been shipped through Kentucky to Nicholasville, and are to be hauled from there to near the Kentucky line and placed in the hands of Union men in Kentucky on the line to be conveyed to Union men in Tennessee. They openly proclaim that if the Legislature refuses to let them secede they will resist to the death and call upon Lincoln for aid. Nelson, Brownlow, and Maynard are the leaders.”

The notion of 10,000 weapons flowing into East Tennessee from Cincinnati would be quite the surprise to General Sherman, then in command of Federal troops in Kentucky.  There was no small amount of rumor included in the message to Senator Toombs.  As Mr. Tate travelled the length of East Tennessee, and considering the level of frustration among the people, he likely had empirical evidence for another bit of intelligence he relates to the Senator.  “A number of Union companies are forming and drilling daily in the disaffected districts for the avowed purpose of resistance. Let the Government look closely to this movement. Unless nipped in the bud it may become very troublesome.”[13]   Within six months Mr. Tate’s message to the Senator from Georgia would seem prophetic.

The last half of July saw active recruitment of Federal regiments in Kentucky at Camp Dick Robinson.  Simon Bolivar Buckner had called up the Kentucky State Militia and essentially took it to Tennessee to form Camp Trousdale.  This sudden appearance of Confederate troops on Kentucky’s southern border led Kentucky Unionists to demand some kind of defense in that area of the state which resulted in a growing collection of recruits around Nolin Creek.  This growing presence of Federal troops in Kentucky led Confederate General Leonidas Polk to cross the river and occupy Belmont, declaring Kentucky’s Neutrality a sham.

In Tennessee, Felix Zollicoffer was appointed as Brigadier General to command East Tennessee, and regiments of varying readiness were ordered to the region. Confederate commanders seemed to be growing forth from trees.  The Confederate situation in East Tennessee was sufficiently muddled that Zollicoffer wrote to Confederate Adjutant General Samuel Cooper with some frustration, “I am here to comprehend facts.  Under great confusion of orders from Nashville. … Which regiments shall I assume command of for East Tennessee Service?”[14]  To frustrated Unionists these movements were cause for great concern no matter how disorganized.  As Confederate troops attempted to block the passes of the northern Tennessee border, many unionists fled the region.  The plight of the East Tennessee refugee began with the dreadful passage of Roger’s Gap, Wilson’s Gap, Cumberland Gap, and many other bridle paths crossing the Cumberland Mountains.  Temple provides a colorful description saying, “…men fleeing for freedom were alert and lynx-eyed.  Darkness would creep over the mountains, and while the Confederate soldiers slept, or dozed at their posts, cunning guides, wide awake and soft of tread as panthers, were leading the refugees in silence along some unexpected way, or scaling beetling steeps, impassable except to men whose lives depend on present strength, coolness and daring.”[15]  Convention delegate, and supporter of T.A.R. Nelson’s radical proposals, Reverend William Blount Carter left East Tennessee for Kentucky during the first weeks of July along with so many others.  In September Reverend Carter would make his way first to Camp Dick Robinson where he met with his brother, then a Navy Lieutenant but would soon become Army General, Samuel Powhatan Carter, Senator Andrew Johnson, Congressman Horace Maynard and General Thomas.  A plan was hatched during this conference and the group sent Reverend Carter on to Washington DC.[16]   He met with President Lincoln, Secretary of State Seward, and General McClellan around mid-September and presented to them the audacious plan to bring relief to East Tennessee.  The plan consisted of Unionist attacks on eight railroad bridges from Bristol on the Virginia border to Bridgeport Alabama with the goal of destroying them, severing the supply lines from the heart of the Confederacy to the eastern theater.  As the smoke was still rising from the burning bridges, a Federal column would descend on Cumberland Gap and seize East Tennessee.   The President and Secretary of State were reasonably convinced of the plan.  Enough so that Secretary of State Seward gave Reverend Carter $2,500 for the purposes of the destruction of the bridges.  General McClellan “promised to aid in the movement by sending an army into East Tennessee as soon as possible”.[17]  Lincoln would write an order for the campaign but, perhaps more foreshadowing of what was to come, this handwritten order was not entered into the Headquarters of the Army books until the end of October.[18]   It seems apparent, however, that the plan was communicated to Secretary of War Cameron.  On October 10^th Adjutant-General Lorenzo Thomas instructs both Sherman and Mitchell to prepare for “an outward movement, the object being to take possession of Cumberland Ford and Cumberland Gap, and ultimately seize the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad”.[19]  General William Tecumseh Sherman had been appointed to the command of the Department of the Cumberland just two days prior in the wake of the resignation of General Robert Anderson, formerly the Major Anderson of Fort Sumter fame.  Sherman was aware of the situation in Kentucky so when Reverend Carter returned to Camp Dick Robinson from his successful discussion with President Lincoln and friends there was very little to catch the commander up on.  At first, Sherman was opposed to the idea.  Too few available men and fewer weapons available for those too few men was likely Sherman’s argument.  General Thomas convinced Sherman who gave the order to proceed. [20] Reverend Carter had to be ecstatic as he picked a few officers from the few East Tennessee Infantry regiments to be leaders in the endeavor.     His brother now a Brigadier General with the 1^st and 2^nd East Tennessee Regiments under his command, the Reverend surely felt the nucleus of the relief force was already in place at Camp Dick Robinson as he left for home on October 18th.[21]   He couldn’t possibly know that the events to transpire over the next two weeks would scuttle any effort to send a military force into East Tennessee.  In fact, as he was leaving Camp Dick Robinson the first nails in the coffin of the military relief effort were being driven as Confederate General Zollicoffer threatened Colonel Theopholus Toulman Garrard  and his small force of Federals at Camp Wildcat.  The defeat of Zollicoffer at Wildcat three days later compelled him to fall back on Cumberland Ford and then on to Cumberland Gap resulting in a force of around 3,000 men plus artillery holding the primary gap from which any Federal military relief column would have to cross.  Further complicating matters was Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston in western Kentucky.  Sherman was very concerned about the prospect of Johnston moving in concert with Buckner or Zollicoffer and attacking Thomas at Camp Dick Robinson. Sherman’s likely fear was by extending Thomas’ small force against Zollicoffer at Cumberland Gap he would be leaving McCook at Nolin Creek as the only force to stop Johnston and Buckner from occupying Louisiville.  He wrote in his Memoirs concerning Johnston, “Had he done so in October, 1861, he could have walked into Louisville, and the vital part of the population would have hailed him as a deliverer.” [22] The reason for Johnston not making this move may have been a lack of a clear command structure.  That would be resolved on October 28^th with the publication of Special Orders No. 51 assigning Johnston “immediate command of the army corps of Central Kentucky.”[23]

Sherman’s apprehensions about the current state of affairs were not felt by the East Tennessee Unionist he had agreed to relieve earlier in the month.  The news of the defeat of Zollicoffer at Wildcat had many of them expressing their joy against Colonel William B Woods’ 16^th Alabama in the streets of Knoxville on the same day as Johnston’s command announcement.  Colonel Woods with several companies of his 16^th Alabama Infantry were at Knoxville in the Headquarters of General Zollicoffer’s army.  In a report to Zollicoffer detailing movements of supplies he wrote:

The news of your falling back to Cumberland Ford has had the effect of developing a feeling that has only been kept under by the presence of troops. It was plainly visible that the Union men were so elated that they could scarcely repress an open expression of their joy. This afternoon it assumed an open character, and some eight or ten of the bullies and leaders made an attack on some of my men near the Lamar House, and seriously wounded several. “…” The Southerners here are considerably alarmed, believing that there is a preconcerted movement amongst the Union men, if by any means the enemy should get into Tennessee. J. Swan told me to-night that he heard one say this evening, as Captain White’s cavalry rode through town, that “they could do so now, but in less than ten days the Union forces would be here and run them off.”[24]

It has been said that the best way for two people to keep a secret is if one of them are dead.    Reverend Carter wrote to Thomas at Camp Dick Robinson on the 27^th saying, “Men and women weep for joy when I merely hint to them that the day of our deliverance is at hand.”[25]  Those “mere hints” along with the defeat of the Confederates at Wildcat had emboldened the Unionists of Knoxville enough that they felt no concern whatever of talking about their coming relief openly.  Clearly Reverend Carter’s plan had become the subject of gossip in Knoxville.  Unfortunately for the Unionists, there were events working against the plan discussed with President Lincoln in September.   Johnston’s promotion to Corps command probably confirmed in Sherman the threat from the Western Confederates.  Sherman tells Thomas to halt his pursuit of Zollicoffer on the 29^th and consolidates Schoepf’s brigade at London and supply hub at Crab Orchard.[26] Over the next week there was much hand wringing on the part of the Federal commanders as they tried to plan for the Confederate’s next move.  Sherman’s concern over the Confederate presence in south central Kentucky comes to a boiling point as Colonel Hoskins of the 12^th Kentucky reports 20,000 Confederate troops around Monticello on November 2^nd.  [27]  Hoskins report was wildly exaggerated but soon enough, as if answering  the Colonel, General Zollicoffer would take the bulk of his command toward Jacksboro leaving the 11^th TN, 34^th TN, and a battalion of the 16^th AL under Lieutenant Colonel Harris along with seven companies of Cavalry at Cumberland Gap.[28]   Sherman was paralyzed.  Over the next week he shuffled troops east and west before finally settling on the advance by Zollicoffer on south central Kentucky but by then it would be far too late for Reverend Carter’s men.

 

While the generals contemplated and moved troops around the map of Kentucky and Tennessee, the men in the ranks of Federal General Thomas’ camps around London Kentucky gnashed their teeth.  Particularly the East Tennesseans under now Brigadier General S.P. Carter, the rumors of the much wanted advance into their home country, and quite likely the efforts to burn the bridges as well, were running rampant through the camps.  Rumors are and likely always will be a staple in any large group of people and perhaps more so with an army in the field.  Those rumors are fertilized with the passage of notable people through the camps.  Senator Andrew Johnson and Congressman Horace Maynard passed through the camps in London regularly.  Whether in person or in the print or words of reporters it made no matter, they fueled the rumor mill with fact and fiction alike.  Both types of annoyances were so prevalent in the camps of General Schoepf’s Kentucky Brigade that he wrote to General Thomas saying:[29]

                “With importunate citizens on one side and meddlesome reporters for papers on the other, I can scarce find time to attend to the appropriate duties of my position. By the way, cannot something be done to rid our camps of this latter class? I have really reached that point that I am afraid to address my staff officer above a whisper in my own tent. My most trivial remarks to my officers are caught up, magnified, and embellished, and appear in print as my “expressed opinions,” much to the surprise of myself and those to whom my remarks were addressed”

The lack of movement, rumors and reporters, and the continued desire to relieve their countrymen became so extreme that on November 7^th, General Thomas  urged General Schoepf to start “dealing decidedly with such people, and you have my authority and orders for doing so.  We must learn to abide our time, or we shall never be successful.”[30]  Sadly for the Tennesseans, time was about to run out for their countrymen.

By November 8^th Reverend William Blount Carter had his men in place.  The men returned to their own sections of the country to gather their teams.  They were set and by dawn their work would be complete.

 

The morning of November 9^th found Confederate telegraph wires ablaze with traffic.  Everyone from Confederate sympathizing citizens to Rail Road owners, to the Governor and Military Commanders were panicking, unsure what was coming next.  John Branner, President of the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, sent the following to Secretary of War Judah Benjamin:[31]

KNOXVILLE, November 9, 1861.

 Hon. J.P. BENJAMIN:
Two large bridges on my road were burned last night about 12 o’clock; also one bridge on the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad at the same time, and an effort made to burn the largest bridge on my road. There is great excitement along the whole line of road, and evidence that the Union party are organizing and preparing to destroy or take possession of the whole line from Bristol and Chattanooga, and unless the Government is very prompt in giving us the necessary military aid, I much fear the result. The only hope for protection must be from the Government. Unless the Government gives us the necessary aid and protection at once, transportation over my road of army supplies will be an utter impossibility. It cannot be done. We have arrested four of the individuals engaged in burning one bridge, and know who burned another, but for want of the necessary military force fear we cannot arrest them.

 JOHN R. BRANNER,
President East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad.

 

In Bristol, local authorities had lost communication with Nashville and appealed to the Governor of Virginia, John Letcher, for aid:[32]

BRISTOL, November 9, 1861.

 Hon. JOHN LETCHER:
DEAR SIR: Upon the oath of J. H. Rudd, conductor of the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad Company, and news received from A. M. Millard, the representative of Sullivan County, Tennessee, by note, whose handwriting was testified to by George Pile and Jos. R. Anderson, I do hereby inform you that the bridge across the Holston was burned last night by about 50 Union men, and that a Union force is now assembling near Watauga Bridge, reported to number about 500, for the purpose of attacking Captain McClellan’s troops, now stationed at the bridge, and burning the bridge, and ask aid, as we are unable to form any idea of the result of this, and furthermore state that all communication between this place and Nashville by railroad and telegraph is cut off, and ask that you appeal to President Davis to call out the militia of East Tennessee to suppress rebellion.

F. MOORE,
J.P., Washington County, Virginia.

Of the nine bridges targeted, the bridges at Union, Lick Creek near Pottertown(present day Moshiem), Charleston, and the two spans across the Chickamauga near Chattanooga were destroyed.  The other four bridges were likely well-guarded and the attempts to destroy them were abandoned.[33]  As Confederate authorities struggled to get a military response in play, Unionists came out in droves across East Tennessee.  Colonel Wood in Knoxville reported 1,000 Unionists gathering at Strawberry Plains and another 500 gathering at the Loudon bridge.[34]  With growing reports of heavier and heavier turnout of unionists across the region, high level Confederate Authorities began taking control.  On November 10^th Colonel Daniel Leadbetter was ordered to the region by Secretary of War Judah Benjamin along with a battalion of infantry and some artillery to “keep up the line of communication by rail between Bristol and Chattanooga.”[35]  Governor Isham Harris called on Confederate President Jefferson Davis on November 12^th for assistance:[36]

NASHVILLE, November 12, 1861.

 His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS:

The burning of railroad bridges in East Tennessee shows a deep-seated spirit of rebellion in that section. Union men are organizing. This rebellion must be crushed out instantly, the leaders arrested, and summarily punished. I shall send immediately about 10,000 men to that section; cannot arm larger force at present. If you can possibly send from Western Virginia a number of Tennessee regiments to East Tennessee, we can at once repair the bridges and crush out the rebellion. I hope to be able very soon to collect a large number of sporting  guns in the State to arm our volunteers, and will co-operate with the Government to the fullest extent of my ability in all respects. If a part only of the Tennessee troops in Western Virginia shall be sent, I would prefer Anderson’s brigade.

 ISHAM G. HARRIS.

Confederate troops and citizen militias spread out through the country in an attempt to quell the rebellion.  If the situation of the unionists wasn’t bad enough in July after secession it would get far worse after the bridge attacks as no federal column materialized to support the effort.  Over the next two weeks the Confederate Government and that of Tennessee became more and more aggressive in the actions against the rebelling Unionists.  On November 25^th the situation was so intense that Secretary Benjamin issued the following order to Col. Wood in Knoxville:

WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,
Richmond, November 25, 1861.

 Col. W. B. WOOD,  Knoxville, Tenn.:

SIR: Your report of the 20th instant is received, and I proceed to give you the desired instructions in relation to the prisoners taken by you amongst the traitors in East Tennessee:

1st. All such as can be identified as having been engaged in bridge-burning are to be tried summarily by drum-head court-martial, and, if found guilty, executed on the spot by hanging. It would be well to leave their bodies hanging in the vicinity of the burned bridges.

2d. All such as have not been so engaged are to be treated as prisoners of war, and sent with an armed guard to Tuscaloosa, Ala., there to be kept imprisoned at the depot selected by the Government for prisoners of war. Wherever you can discover that arms are concealed by these traitors you will send out detachments, search for and seize the arms. In no case is one of the men known to have been up in arms against the Government to be released on any pledge or oath of allegiance. The time for such measures is past. They are all to be held as prisoners of war, and held in jail till the end of the war. Such as come in voluntarily, take the oath of allegiance, and surrender their arms are alone to be treated with leniency.

Your vigilant execution of these orders is earnestly urged by the Government.

Your obedient servant,

 J.P. BENJAMIN,
Secretary of War.

Whether by official action or the acts of mobs, unionists and anyone thought to be supporting the union throughout east Tennessee were arrested and sent to Knoxville.  Some of these individuals would eventually find themselves in the Prisoner of War prison at Tuscaloosa Alabama where they were left in such harsh conditions that many never returned.  Benjamin’s execution order was promptly carried out by Colonel Daniel Ledbetter with the hanging of Jacob Hinshaw and Henry Fry on November 30^th.[37]  Their bodies, as defined in the Secretary of War’s order, were left hanging by the Lick Creek bridge they had attacked just three weeks earlier.   There were two primary forces of Confederate military authority working in East Tennessee in the early winter of 1861.  Colonel Daniel Ledbetter was originally from Maine but married a southern bride.  His “Yankee” heritage brought with it some suspicion which he strived to allay by zealous obedience to orders.[38]  Brigadier General William H Carroll was a native of Nashville and unlike Colonel Ledbetter had no bonafides to establish as to his loyalty.  His treatment of unionists associated with the bridge attacks were according to orders from his superiors but his offer of release in exchange of an oath and bond for Union prisoners would seem to indicate a certain liberality with his countrymen at least compared to Secretary Benjamin and Colonel Ledbetter.[39]  Benjamin would have none of General Carroll’s oath and bond and corrected this behavior immediately.[40]

The East Tennessee rebellion as it has come to be known was really an accident brought about by a failed military operation on the one hand and an emotional response by the unionists in the region on the other.  When Reverend Carter returned to Camp Dick Robinson in October, General Sherman was not overly impressed with the plan to burn the bridges and invade East Tennessee.  He knew his situation as he would later spell out for Secretary of War Cameron.  The Federal strength wasn’t strong enough to manage the threat already levied against it let alone any attempts at offensive operations.  General Thomas somehow managed to convince Sherman to accede to the plan.  Reverend Carter had to believe such a column was coming when he set his men on their unalterable course in early November.  The rumors of the impending invasion were clearly rampant throughout East Tennessee so when the bridges were attacked and some destroyed, the turnout of armed unionist citizens comes as no surprise.  The rumor had taken root and become fact in the hearts of the unionists.  Unfortunately for them their turnout resulted in the imprisonment of hundreds if not thousands of union supporting men across the whole of the region.  Whether they had an active role in the bridge burnings or not, the mere rumor of union sympathies was enough for husband, father, and son to be arrested and imprisoned in Knoxville if they were lucky and Tuscaloosa Alabama where many would never return.  The policies of Secretary of War Benjamin as carried out by the likes of Colonel Daniel Ledbetter drove the surviving unionists back to their homes in fear of summary execution or out of the state into Kentucky to join the Federal army.  So far as the coming Cumberland Gap campaign is concerned, the East Tennessee Rebellion fed the Union army with thousands of troops fleeing the Confederate response back home.  There may well have been no brigade for James Spears to command without these men.

 

Sources\References

[1] (Wilson, 170) & (Temple, 88)

[2] (McKenzie, 17-18)

[3] (Temple, 345)

[4] Ibid

[5] (DeLeon, 71)

[6] (Department, 368)

[7] (Fleming, 19)

[8] (Carter, 17)

[9] (Temple, 358)

[10] (Fleming, 27)

[11] O.R.–SERIES I–VOLUME LII/2 [S# 110] pg108  – 25 MAY 1861; O.R.–SERIES IV–VOLUME I [S# 127] pg376 – 13 JUN 1861; O.R.–SERIES I–VOLUME LII/2 [S# 110] pg114 – 22 JUN 1861

[12] O.R.–SERIES I–VOLUME LII/2 [S# 110]pg 116

[13] Ibid

[14] O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME IV [S# 4] CHAPTER XII. p377

[15] (Temple, 370)

[16] (Temple, 375)

[17] Ibid

[18] O.R.–SERIES I–VOLUME LII/1 [S# 109] p191

[19] O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME IV [S# 4] CHAPTER XII. p299

[20] (Temple, 376)

[21] (Temple, 377)

[22] (Sherman, 228)

[23] O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME IV [S# 4] CHAPTER XII. p484

[24] O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME IV [S# 4] CHAPTER XII. p482

[25] O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME IV [S# 4] CHAPTER XII. p320

[26] O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME IV [S# 4] CHAPTER XII. p323 & p325

[27] O.R. — SERIES I–VOLUME IV [S# 4] CHAPTER XII. p328

[28] O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME IV [S# 4] CHAPTER XII. p521

[29] O.R. — SERIES I–VOLUME IV [S# 4] CHAPTER XII. p347

[30] O.R. — SERIES I–VOLUME IV [S# 4] CHAPTER XII. p343

[31] O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME IV [S# 4] CHAPTER XII.  p231

[32] O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME IV [S# 4] CHAPTER XII.  p231

[33] (Temple, 379)

[34] O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME IV [S# 4] CHAPTER XII. p236

[35] O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME IV [S# 4] CHAPTER XII. p234

[36] O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME IV [S# 4] CHAPTER XII. P240

[37] O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 7 [S# 7] p726

[38] (Temple, 394)

[39] O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME IV [S# 4] CHAPTER XII. P245

[40] O.R. — SERIES I–VOLUME 7 [S# 7] p701

Bibliography

Bancroft, George. 1883. History of the Formation of the Constitution of the United States of America, Vol I. New York, New York: D. Appleton and Company.

Carter, William Randolph. 1902. History of the First Regiment of Tennessee Volunteer Cavalry in the Great War of the Rebellion. Knoxville, TN: Gaut-Ogden Co., Printers and Binders.

DeLeon, Thomas Cooper. 1892. Four Years in Rebel Capitals. Mobile, AL: The Gossip Printing Company.

Department, War. 1900. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Washington: Government Printing Office.

Fleming, John M. 1861. “Proceedings of the E. T. Convention.” C.M. McClung Historical Collection, Knox County Public Library. May 30-31. Accessed August 11, 2013. http://cmdc.knoxlib.org/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15136coll4/id/422/rec/6.

Sherman, William Tecumseh. 1913. Memoirs of General William T. Sherman. Vol. 1, in Memoirs of General William T. Sherman, Second Edition, Revised and Corrected Vol 1, by William Tecumseh Sherman. New York: D.A. Appleton.

Temple, Oliver Perry. 1899. East Tennessee and the Civil War. Cincinnati, Ohio: The Robert Clarke Company.

Wilson, Henry. 1872. History of the rise and fall of the slave power in America Vol 1. Boston, MA: J.R. Osgood and Co.

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Posted By Wayne on December 27, 2016

Some genealogists are looking for Heroes.  Some genealogists are looking for the pure story of their families.  Other genealogists started out in the first two categories and landed in the place of just loving the research.  For me?  I have wanted to get across the pond and have some idea where I come from in Europe.  In the case of my mother’s line it is easy enough.  My maternal grandmother was from a clean line of German ancestry.  With surnames like Karnap, Springer, and Sogelhost the evidence is clear enough but family bibles and legends puts the family in Northern Germany around Hanover.

My father’s line, both maternal and paternal, have long held the legend that we come from England.  When I did the Ancestry DNA test, the results came back 87% Great Britian with the other 13% scattered around western Europe but we haven’t really found anything remotely concrete in that direction…until now.

My father’s maternal line is the Smithers family of Estill County Kentucky.  My father was named after two of my grandmother’s uncles, Augustine and Edward Smithers.  Their father was Andrew Jackson Smithers who’s mother was Rebecca Crow.  It is this Crow line where I hit pay dirt a couple weeks ago.

While researching Daniel Crow, Rebecca’s grandfather,  I stumbled across a reference to “The King’s passengers to Maryland and Virginia” ( 929.342 COLD ) pg 200-201 and had a friend in Fairfax County Virginia go and snap some pics of the necessary pages. (Jackie, you are a true SAINT!)

Here we see “Daniel Crowe” was a Felon and transported from London to Virginia on the Neptune, Captained by James Arbuckle in January 1768.   If this were my wife’s family, the Felon part wouldn’t have surprised me much but in this case it kinda made me curious as to what Mr. Crowe\Crow was convicted of.  After a bit more searching on my part and 5 minutes of Google-Fu from my Bride we now have separate corroborating evidence of the Neptune’s arrival in Virginia. The newspaper clip is from the Virginia Gazette on March 3rd, 1768….172 years to the day from my father’s, Daniel Crow’s 4th great grandson, birthday.

I was then faced with just how Daniel found himself in this predicament and once again my Google Genius Bride comes through.  It seems that there is a website that keeps track of these 18th Century criminal proceedings called Old Bailey Online.  Some amazing reading here that I will have to get into later but first The Bride found this and if you search the text for “Daniel Crow” you can read…

Reference Number: t17671209-47

56, 57. (M.) Daniel Crow and William Cane , otherwise Wane , were indicted for stealing one copper dog’s collar, value 10 d. the property of Samuel Watkins , Dec. 9 . +

Samuel Watkins . I am a butcher ; last Wednesday in the afternoon, between four and five o’clock, a young woman came, and said, she saw two men logging my dog away by the collar (producing a large copper collar with a lock upon it;) this is the collar; my son went, and pursued and took them; they were the two prisoners, and by the assistance of others brought them to my door; they had not taken it off the dog; we searched them, and in Crow’s pocket was found these couples (producing a chain to couple two dogs together.)

Jane Jelse . I was at a parlour window between four and five o’clock, and saw the two prisoners hawling the dog down the street; I called to them, and said, what are you going to do with the dog; Crow lugged him away the faster; then I sent a person up to Mr. Watkins, to let him know (I find they changed names, for that was Cane, he called himself Crow at Sir John Fielding’s)

Samuel Watkins the younger. We generally put the dogs up on the desk of the evening; I came home, and bolted them into the shop; I had not been gone to my father above two minutes, but the young woman came and called in a very loud manner, there are two men gone with your dog down Pennington-street; I followed them as fast as possible, and came up to them on the farther side of the field; Cane seeing me coming sat down; I laid hold of his collar, and called two men from the brick-field to my assistance; the prisoners were together, and the dog with them, but neither of them had hold of the dog when I got there; I called him, he came to me immediately; we brought the prisoners to our house, I found the shop-door open when the girl called, and nobody had been there except the prisoners.

Prosecutor. Crow deals in dogs; mine was betwixt a massiff and a Dane, he weighs 16 stone 3 pounds.

The prisoner in their defence said, they did not touch the dog; Crow said he was a butcher, and Cane said he was a gold-beater, and that he had that couple to put on his own dog at home.

Cane called John Margan , Edward Harman, Elizabeth Smith , and Richard his brother, who gave him a good character.

Both Guilty . T .

So my 5th Great Grandfather was kicked out of England for stealing a dog collar.  Awesome.  BUT WAIT!  THERE’S MORE!

In the Coldham book I noticed another name, Susanna Skelton.  She was on the same boat to America with Daniel Crow.  Earlier research I had gathered from another researcher had Daniel Crow married to a Susanna Shelton so the Skelton caught my eye.  I still have no marriage document for them but upon finding Rebecca’s Old Bailey record and doing some map work I can’t help but think these two could have known each other prior to their conviction or at least once onboard the Neptune they likely found each other.

So first, Susanna’s Old Bailey record:

Reference Number: t17671209-15

17, 18. (L.) Thomas Newman and Susanna Skelton were indicted for stealing 150 pounds weight of sugar, value 45 s. the property of a person or persons unknown, Nov. 21 . ++

Robert Friend . I am a porter, I was drinking at the Cock and Anchor in Thames-street, near Billingsgate; on the 21st of November, about half an hour after eight at night, I went over the way to get a halfpenny-worth of tobacco; coming back, I was told there was something concealed in the gate-way; I and John Read went, and on the left-hand side I saw the prisoners, the woman had her arm round the man’s neck; I having a light, saw some sugar spilt; we found two bags of sugar, one was under the woman’s petticoats, and the other under the man’s trowsers; we brought them to the Cock and Anchor, and sent for a constable; the woman made her escape, but was taken at the Brown Bear in East-Smithfield on the 23 d.

John Read deposed to the same purport.

Mr. Woodhouse. On that day I was informed a man and a woman were with some sugar under a gate way in; I went as directed to the Cock and Anchor; then I went to see if any thing was lost from the buildings; I found a hogshead was broke open, I found a rope ladder (produced in court;) I have seen the man at the bar backwards and forwards upon the keys.

Newman’s defence.

I was in at the King’s Arms, and drank two pints of beer; about eight o’clock I went out, and fell down, and this woman went to help me up; I was not out of the King’s Arms five minutes when these people came to me.

Skelton’s defence.

I had but a groat in my pocket; we had two pints of beer; Newman went out to ease himself, I went out after him; he fell down, and I went to help him up; I know nothing of any sugar.

Both Guilty . T .

There was 150lbs of sugar involved in this case.  Thomas Newman had one bag when he was captured.  Susanna ran away with 75lbs of sugar under her skirt?  Okay…sure.  But where did she run to?  East-Smithfield?  Where exactly is that I wondered.  Using modern maps for this kind of research can be useful if the ground hadn’t changed that much and I knew that London is a modern city that remembers its past fondly.  I’m not a Londoner but I know that large cities like that may keep street names due to the historical traditions but the actual street locations may have moved.  Thankfully Billingsgate is quite the landmark in London and easily found on the modern maps.  While the Billingsgate Market has moved a bit, it gave me a decent idea of where the original place may have been.  Still, I was on the hunt for some maps from the late 1760s.  Luck was with me this time as it only took about 5 minutes to find Mapco.net with this awesome 1767 map of London.

So Daniel’s case said he and Mr. Cane were trying to take the dog down Pennington Street near a brick-field.  This is the environment around Pennington Street in London:

Notice “Gravel Lane” and “New Gravel Lane” on either side of an open area?  Wondering if that is the “brick-field” mentioned in the court case…dunno.

Susanna’s “crime scene” started at a pub in Thames-street near Billingsgate:

but she “made her escape” and was later captured in another pub in “East-Smithfield” which is here:

Of all the places for Susanna to flee, she was captured about a mile and half east of the initial pub at Billingsgate and roughly 2 blocks from the location of Daniel’s crime seen which had not happened yet.  Susanna was arrested on Saturday, November 21st while Daniel wasn’t arrested until Wednesday, December 9th over two weeks later.

How much of a stretch is it to say these two knew each other while still in London?  I’ll grant you that it is a bit of a stretch.  Clearly, however, they were familiar with the same area of town.  A thief on the run isn’t going to run into unfamiliar territory.  How much of a stretch is it to say they met on the Neptune?  Personally I think either stretch is possible.  Perhaps they knew of each other while in London and the voyage to Virginia brought them closer?  However it happened, I am about as convinced as I can be that Susanna Skelton in the Old Bailey records is the Susanna Shelton my research partner had in his work….I just need a marriage document!

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Posted By Wayne on March 25, 2016

On October 16th  of 1861, General William Tecumseh Sherman met with Secretary of War Simon Cameron at the Galt House in Louisville.  Sherman was new to his position as Department Commander and wanted to brief his boss on the situation in Kentucky.  As Sherman entered the room he was greeted by an entourage of reporters and the Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas.  Sherman seemed reluctant to begin his briefing but Cameron told him they were all “family” and he could “speak your mind without restraint.”  Sherman did just that.  He spread a large map of the United States across a desk and pointed to Northern Virginia.  He explained that General McClellan had a front of roughly 100 miles with the enemy and about 100,o00 men at his disposal.  He then pointed to Missouri where General Fremont reigned and explained that he also had about 100 miles of frontage with the enemy and about 60,000 men.  Meanwhile, Sherman had 300+ miles of frontage with the enemy, from General Johnston in Columbus to General Zollicoffer at Cumberland Gap,  and something like 20,000 effective, armed troops to work with.  He went on to say that the men of Kentucky were being offered Belgian smoothbore muskets as weapons.  These same weapons were being refused by Ohio and Indiana troops in favor of the Enfield rifled musket.

Sherman wrote, “I argued that, for the purpose of defense, we should have sixty thousand men at one, and for offense, we would need two hundred thousand, before we were done.”  Secretary Cameron was astonished calling out, “Great God! Where are they to come from!”  Sherman went on to explain there were a great many troops already organized and ready to service from the northwestern states of Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan whose service had been refused by the War Department.  Sherman believed that the conversation was fruitful.  Secretary Cameron instructed General Thomas to make note of the conversation and again suggested that he would “attend to my requests on reaching Washington.” Too little, too late I fear.

The newsies ran with the story at least as far as their journalistic, and decidedly not Military, minds would allow.  First in the northern press and then it spread, complete with editorial comment, to the western papers.  Sherman was mocked as being “crazy, insane, etc” in the press.  On November 11th, Sherman mentions to General George W. Thomas:

My expression of dissatisfaction at the publication of Thomas’ report and request to be relieved from this charge has led to the assignment of General Buell, of whom I have not yet heard.

I have to ask, what part of Thomas’s report to the Secretary of War was substantially different than what Sherman wrote in his Memoirs?  I will gladly give the position that the Memoirs were written much later but Sherman himself notes that Thomas J Wood offered a statement as to the accuracy of Sherman’s Memoirs, he being present during the meeting.

I believe that Sherman was wrong labelled by the Newsies of the time.  While I haven’t been able to find a copy of a paper calling him “insane, crazy, etc”, he has clearly been slapped with that by history and that is a serious shame.  His condition in Kentucky was exactly as he stated.  Buell’s incompetence had nothing to do with the success at Perryville.  That is solely due to a stubborn defense by Starkweather and a poorly planned attack resulting in exhausted Confederate troops.   Had Sherman’s request been at least considered seriously, things may have been quite different.  Especially considering the September 1861 meeting between Lincoln, Seward, and Reverend William Blount Carter in Washington…but that is for another post.

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Posted By Wayne on February 8, 2013

I will be back at the Genealogy Jamboree at Cumberland Gap this year.  The dates are June 6, 7, and 8 2013.  I will be talking about ways to better understand Civil War Muster Records on Thursday the 6th at 2:30p and Friday the 7th at 1p in the Visitor Center Auditorium.

The presentation can be found here.

 

 

 

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Posted By Wayne on May 21, 2012

Category: 7th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry(US) | 2 Comments »
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Posted By Wayne on February 5, 2012

When a newspaper today publishes something having to do with the war d’jour or some foreign policy decision or indecision there are howls of protest from one side or the other of the political spectrum and sometimes both.  Either the paper shouldn’t have published this because it endangered operations or the paper was insensitive to the dead of another operation.  It usually comes down to the scoring of some political point or another.  Sometimes, however, you just have to sit back and wonder, “What were they thinking?”

In early October of 1861, no one was really sure what horrors the Civil War were going to bring to Kentucky.  Both Federal and Confederate forces were forming in and around the state and every man joining these organizations were chomping at the bit for their own bit of glory.  General Sherman assumed command in Kentucky with the retirement of General Robert Anderson of Fort Sumter fame and quickly set to work organizing the mess.  This mess was not at all General Anderson’s fault but…it was still a mess.

On October 16th General Sherman met with Secretary of War Simon Cameron and Adjutant-General Lorenzo Thomas at the Galt House in Louisville.  Secretary Cameron brought with him something of an entourage of reporters which, when General Sherman questioned their attendance for the discussion, Cameron said:

They are all friends, all members of my family, and you may speak your mind freely and without restraint.

That should have been a clue to General Sherman.  Chalk it up to Sherman’s exhaustion or excitement but he missed the clue and would pay dearly for it just two weeks later.

The discussion, as related in General Sherman’s Memoirs, was quite frank and direct.  Sherman laid a map of the United States on a table and explained his situation.  General Fremont in Missouri had a 100 mile front with the Confederate Forces and had 60,000 men for his operations.  General McClellan in Northern Virginia had about the same 100 mile front with Confederate Forces and had 100,000 men for his operations.  General Sherman had a 300 mile front, from the Big Sandy River valley to Paducah, with only 18,000 men and weapons that the Indiana and Ohio Governors had rejected for their own troops.  He outlined where his troops were, where he wanted more troops, and suggested just where those troops would come from.  He discussed his plans for operations, weaknesses in his line, and his thoughts on the movements of Confederate Generals Zollicoffer, Buckner, and Johnston.  He felt his position so weak that “…if Johnston chose, he could march to Louisville any day.”  Secretary Cameron was “astonished” by some of these facts.  He ordered Adjutant-General Thomas to make notes of this so he could attend to them upon his return to Washington.

On October 31st, the New York Times reported the entirety of Thomas’ report to Secretary Cameron.  The same report that would allow General Buell to build his Army that would defeat Zollicoffer at Mill Springs, help save Grant at Shiloh, and ultimately save Kentucky for the Union at Perryville(no thanks to Buell’s personal efforts).  The same report that would find its way into the Official Record of the War of the Rebellion some 20 years later.  How could such critically dangerous information find its way into a national newspaper just 2 weeks after the meeting took place?  With a room full of reporters during the discussion it shouldn’t be any real surprise but there were two others in the room as well and one of them had a penchant for story telling.

Doris Kearns Goodwin’s book, Team of Rivals, offers a bit of insight useful for our purposes.  It seems that Secretary Cameron had something of a checkered past.  She said, “For years, charges of bribery and bad dealings with the Winnebago indians had sullied Cameron’s name” and “Considering  Lincoln’s ‘well known rigid adherence to honesty,’ it seemed impossible to Villard(a correspondent following the newly elected President) that Honest Abe would besmirch his cabinet with someone of Cameron’s unsavory reputation.”  When President Lincoln offered the post of Secretary of War to Cameron, Cameron asked Lincoln to put it in writing.  When Cameron returned home to Pennsylvania,  Goodwin writes “he brandished the offer among his friends like ‘an exuberant school boy.'”  With this in mind it isn’t difficult to see Cameron offering some long winded tale as one of his reporter “family members” scarfed up Thomas’ report.

Adjutant-General Lorenzo Thomas was also quite the character.  Gabor Boritt in his book Lincoln’s Generals appears to make the claim that Thomas was responsible for efforts to label General Sherman as “insane”.  He was arrogant and power hungry so it doesn’t seem to much of a stretch that he could have leaked the report himself.

Who leaked it wasn’t nearly as damaging as that it was leaked at all.  The New York Times is the earliest publication I can find of the report and they attribute their source to “The Tribune”.  I don’t know if that is a paper in New York called “The Tribune” or some other “Tribune” across the country.  On the same day the report was published the Times also offered an editorial where they state:

The report of Adj.-Gen. THOMAS to the Secretary of War, in regard to the condition of the Western Military Department and the manner of conducting business under Major Gen. FREMONT’S administration, which we publish in the TIMES to-day, is certainly the most remarkable document that has seen the light since the beginning of the present war. We allude not so much to the matter of the report, though that is astounding, perplexing and painful enough; but to the  fact that such a document, so singular in its details, so damaging, if true, to the National cause in its revelations of our weakness to the enemy, and so  disgraceful to one of the first officers of the country and to his aids and  associates, was permitted to be published at all, in the informal and unsustained shape of the diary of a traveling Adjutant.

So, they understood the damage this report could inflict on the “National cause” yet they publish the report anyway in a superficial effort to score some points against the Tribune:

If the TIMES’ publication of the power of the American fleet, sailing to an unknown shore, excited
the “surprise and indignation” of the Cabinet and of the Tribune, what will their verdict be on this
unparalleled exposure of the inefficiency of our Generals and their armies, and the indication of
their plans of moving through the enemy’s country?

Is it just me…or could there be a better way of dealing with this, still score your petty coup, and at least make an effort to limit the potential damage caused?

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Posted By Wayne on January 29, 2012

If a modern General took 4 months to show ANY SIGNS of movement toward a military objective he would be replaced forthwith and that is even discounting our modern communications. General Buell had been given explicit orders to move on East Tennessee SIX TIMES from assuming command on Nov 15, 1861 through February 1862 but Buell ignored or circumvented the orders by suggesting, for example, on November 27, a well concieved, simple, and easy to remember plan to move on….NASHVILLE? All the OR citations are below.  Will TRY and link them to Cornell’s site but…we’ll see. 🙂

Buell’s Ploys

11/15 Buell assumes command.
6111 – O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME IV [S# 4] CHAPTER XII.p358

11/16 Buell gets reinforcements from Western Virginia with the implied suggestion that McClellan “expects you will be able to organize a proper force for immediate operations in the direction of Cumberland Gap”. Buell takes immediate offense and suggests McClellan “has seen cause to curtail his discretion”
6111 – O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME IV [S# 4] CHAPTER XII. p358

11/22 Buell describes his plans to McClellan with all the appropriate butt kissing. This message is a masterwork of passive aggression. He does, however, say that the East TN campaign is being prepared for and “I have by no means abandoned the idea which you put forward prominently; on the contrary, I am studying it carefully and preparing for it, for I find some attraction in it; but neither have I determined on it absolutely, unless I am to understand that the Adjutant-General’s letter absolutely requires it. If it does, I shall execute it carefull and with all my might.” This Adj-Gen letter he speaks of is the one from 11/16.
6111 – O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 7 [S# 7] p443

11/23 Buell, while sending intelligence on the whereabouts of Zollicoffer, breaks down and asks “have you seen cause to curtail my discretion?”
6111 – O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 7 [S# 7] p445

11/25 McClellan tells Buell that the move on E TN is imperative and that only an emergency should prevent it.
6111 – O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 7 [S# 7] p447

11/27 McClellan asks about Buell’s seeming reluctance to move on E TN
6111 – O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 7 [S# 7] p450

Buell responds with a well thought out, robust, simple and easy to remember plan for….Nashville.
6111 – O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 7 [S# 7] p450

11/29 McClellan agrees to Buell’s overall plan but stresses the importance of E TN as the primary objective
6111 – O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 7 [S# 7] p457

12/3 McClellan again begs Buell to move on E TN
6112 – O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 7 [S# 7] p468

12/5 McClellan adds Piketon, where Humphrey Marshall is causing trouble, to the list of ignored imperatives
6112 – O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 7 [S# 7] p473

12/7 Horace Maynard and Andrew Johnson both pleading Buell for a move on E TN
6112 – O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 7 [S# 7] p480

12/8 Buell reports to McClellan on his plans, not a word on E TN or Piketon
6112 – O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 7 [S# 7] p482

Buell responds to Maynard and Johnson claiming he has “no higher honor than that of rescuing our loyal friends in TN”
6112 – O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 7 [S# 7] p483

Maynard sends a chilly message to Thomas about the failure to move on E TN
6112 – O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 7 [S# 7] p484

12/10 BG Buell writes to McClellan, again focusing primarilly on the west, leaving E TN folks with “The allegiance of such people
to hated rulers, even if it could be enforced for the moment, will only make them the more determined and ready to resist when the hour of rescue comes.” Wow
6112 – O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 7 [S# 7] p487

BG Buell sends a portion of Wolford’s Cav to Prestonsburg\Piketon in response to Col Moore’s note on the 9th perhaps?
6112 – O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 7 [S# 7] p489

AC Haun ordered to be hung for his part in the bridge burnings of Nov 7
6112 – O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 7 [S# 7] p754

12/17 US BG Buell lays out positions of Garfield’s BDE to War Dept
6112 – O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 7 [S# 7] p501

12/23 BG Buell forwards summary of activities to MG McClellan…moans about the loss of Carter’s BDE by Schoepf. “The brigade which I had organized in
the Cumberland Gap route has been partially deranged by the unauthorized call of General Schoepf on it to re-enforce Somerset. I shall reinstate it
as soon as possible.” He hadn’t TOUCHED this BDE since taking command.
6112 – O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 7 [S# 7] p511

FHMason, 42OH, on Buell:
“This command was designated the Eighteenth Brigade, Army of the Ohio. The advanced and exposed position of Marshall offered at that time one of the few opportunities open to the Union Army to strike a direct and effective blow, and Gen. Buell, who had accomplished little or nothing, since taking command of the Department, attached no small importance to the favorable result of the expedition up the Big Sandy.”
FHMason – Pg56

1/4 BG Buell seems disinterested in East TN Campaign. MG McClellan adjusts his attitude on the matter
6201 – O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 7 [S# 7] p530

1/7 BG Buell continues to suggest the ‘concert of action’ against the western CS Line being the most important
6201 – O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 7 [S# 7] p535

2/10 Buell wants to see his wub-wub McClellan
6202 – O.R.–SERIES I–VOLUME LII/1 [S# 109] p208

2/15 McClellan wishes to speak with Buell direct. A response to the plea from Buell the 10th?
6202 – O.R.–SERIES I–VOLUME LII/1 [S# 109] p212

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Posted By Wayne on January 29, 2012

Short of the Gospel of course…

General William Tecumseh Sherman on the state of affairs in Kentucky in October of 1861:

I was unnecessarily unhappy, and doubtless exhibited it too
much to those near me ; but it did seem to me that the Govern-
ment at Washington, intent on the larger preparations of Fre-
mont in Missouri and McClellan in Washington, actually ignored ^
us in Kentucky.

Memoires, Pg 307

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Posted By Wayne on April 9, 2011

So, I have found myself with an intense interest in the Signal Corps of late.  I have known about the legendary George Ellsworth of John Hunt Morgan’s Cavalry for a while.  I have also read about various telegraph operators and flag waiving Signal Corps soldiers in the past.  My interest now, however, has turned to the more technical side of the craft.  While perusing Albert Myer’s _A Manual of Signals_ I was reminded of an incident that took place during the 1862 Cumberland Gap Campaign.  While not officially Signal Corps, two men from the 42nd Ohio Volunteer Infantry made great use of the skill and daring nature of the men of the Signal Corps.

August 7th, 1862 found the 42nd Ohio Volunteer Infantry on the east side of Tazewell Tennessee in an attempt to secure provisions for the hungry forces at Cumberland Gap.  Colonel DeCourcy had started this expedition the day previous and marched through Tazewell unopposed.  I’m sure he found this strange and expected to stumble upon a large Confederate force at any moment.  Sergeant Owen Hopkins* and Private Joseph Andrews both of Company K were detailed for a little adventure that is worth sharing.  The following is from Otto F. Bond’s book, _Under the Flag of the Nation_ which is a collection of diary entries from Sgt. Owen Hopkins:

Lieut.-Col. Pardee of the Forty-second ordered the
writer and a private, Joseph Andrews, of the same company,
to crawl quietly to a high ridge covered with young shrubbery
and blackberry bushes, a quarter of a mile in advance of the
skirmish line, and to watch the Rebels’ movements and communicate
by certain signals the same to him.

He cautioned us against making ourselves visible to the
enemy and to use every care against capture, but, if captured,
to remain stubbornly reticent with regard to the exact number
of our force. We were not to fire unless absolutely necessary
to preserve our lives.

The code of signals was unique in the extreme. If the enemy
were cavalry alone, we were to get down on our hands and
knees. If cavalry and infantry both, one was to stand while the
other remained on all fours. If advancing, we were to make
a feint of retiring to the rear. If stationary, a drop of the
cap so denoted.

On reaching the designated spot, we suddenly caught a
startling view of the whole Rebel army, cavalry and infantry.
The former were dismounted at a farmhouse by the roadside
nearly a mile away, their pickets stationed a good distance in
advance at a spring, from which we could see men filling their
canteens. At some distance to the right and in the rear of the
cavalry, was the infantry force of the Rebels; their arms
stacked at the edge of a wood glistened in the sun, and the
dirty gray uniforms flitting here and there were plainly distinguishable
with the naked eye.

Keeping close under cover, we signalled all this to the rear,
where Colonel Pardee was now reading out our signals to
De Courcy, surrounded by other officers. The breaking of a
twig to be held up was the signal in case the enemy had artillery;
this also was communicated, as we could discern several
pieces of brass ordnance planted near the farmhouse.
This piece of news was scarcely necessary, for we had no
sooner imparted it than one of the guns was manned and
trained in our direction. A curl of white smoke wreathed
from its muzzle, and a shot came whizzing high over our
heads, and striking the ground in our rear, burst and scattered
dust and dirt in all directions. This was apparently fired to get
the range, and seemed satisfactory, for it was not tried again
while we were on the lookout. As near as we could make out,
the enemy were about 5,000 strong, infantry and cavalry, with
a battery of field pieces. Watching their movements for nearly
two hours, we at last saw about 200 of the cavalry mount and
ride towards us. Making the fact known by moving to the
rear on all fours, we saw our men hastily form into order of
battle. Lanphear’s battery was placed into position, supported
by the Sixteenth Ohio, while the Forty-second on the left
guarded the road leading up the valley.

Private Frank Mason of Company A, 42nd Ohio witnessed this event and writes in his Regimental History:

In order to improve his opportunities for observation Col Pardee detailed
Sergeant OJ Hopkins of Company K, a zealous and clever soldier, to ascend
a high hill to the left and front of the main position, and communicate the
results of his observations by means of signs previously agreed upon. Certain
gestures and attitudes were specified to indicate the approach of infantry,
cavalry or artillery. Hopkins climbed to his perch and mounted watch. This was
shortly before noon. About one o clock he began to display extraordinary
activity. First he made the sign to indicate the approach of cavalry, then infantry
was signalled, and finally artillery. All the signals were repeated with great vigor
for some minutes when a column of cavalry appeared winding down the road to
where Company C was posted.

I can only imagine the spectacle of these two men, well in advance of their own pickets, trying to communicate back that the whole Confederate Army was not more than a mile away from them…and then advancing!

* I’m guessing on the rank of Hopkins at the time of the Tazewell Expedition.  While Mason clearly states Hopkins was a Sergeant I like to get followup with proper documentation if I can find it.   The Official Roster of the Soldiers of the State of Ohio in the War of the Rebellion 1861-1866 (you don’t find titles of books like that anymore do you?) has Hopkins mustering out as  Quartermaster Sergeant having been promoted from Sergeant of Company K on September 14, 1864 which matches what Mason mentions so I went with it.

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